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ARGUMENT 
A. THE PURCHASE OF BALLAST AND DIESEL 
FUEL FROM A UTAH VENDOR DOES NOT 
GIVE RISE TO SALES TAX IN THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
Respondent argues that Union Pacific purchases of 
ballast and diesel fuel from Utah vendors is a "taxable event" 
and thus is subject to a sales tax. 
The argument of Respondent is that because the sellers 
were not "concerned" with whether the materials were shipped 
outside the state and because the seller did not contract with 
the Union Pacific as common carrier to deliver the materials out 
of state, the requirements of Utah Admin. Code R. 865-18-44S(90) 
has not been met. 
The argument advanced by Respondent totally ignores the 
plain language of part C of Rule 44(S) which states: 
Where delivery is made by the seller to a 
common carrier for transportation to the 
buyer outside the state of Utah, the common 
carrier is deemed to be the agent of the 
vendor for purposes of this section 
regardless of who was responsible for the 
payment of the freight charges. 
The crucial provisions of the Rule are that the 
delivery is made by seller to a common carrier for transportation 
to the buyer outside the state, regardless of who pays the 
freight charges. The Rule does not require that the seller 
contract with the common carrier, only that it deliver to the 
common carrier. 
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Appellee's argument proves too much* In situations in 
which sales are clearly exempt, there would be a "taxable event" 
and, thus, sales taxes payable if Appellee's argument were 
accepted. Typically, the out-of-state purchaser purchases the 
goods from Utah sellers and remits the price of sale to the Utah 
seller. That, within the reasoning of the statute, constitutes a 
"taxable event." However, if the seller tenders the goods to a 
common carrier for delivery outside the state of Utah, no sales 
tax is payable regardless of the fact that a "taxable event" has 
occurred. That is true whether the sale price includes amounts 
paid for delivery by common carrier or whether those charges are 
paid separately by either the seller or the purchaser. 
Searching for the occurrence of some "taxable event" 
does not help with the necessary analysis. In fact, the import 
of subsection C of Rule 44S clearly is that if a "taxable event" 
analysis be appropriate, the taxable event would be delivery by 
the common carrier to the out-of-state purchaser because the 
common carrier is by statute deemed to be the agent of the 
vendor, regardless of whether the vendor or purchaser contract 
with it. 
The facts established that the delivery by the seller 
was to the Union Pacific as common carrier. The waybill 
summaries (Exhibit 2) so indicated. The testimony of the 
witnesses was also unrefuted that the Union Pacific accepts this 
material as a common carrier. (Transcript, p. 18, 35.) 
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Respondent cites the case of Tummurru Trades v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 802 P.2d 715 (Utah 1990) in support of its 
argument. That case, however, did not involve the crucial 
subsection C of Rule 44S. In the Tummurru case, there was no 
delivery to a common carrier by a seller for transportation 
out-of-state. Further, the Tummurru case involved a situation in 
which the purchaser purchased materials, held them in inventory 
and subsequently used them. The Union Pacific did not purchase 
the ballast for inventory and did not place it into inventory. 
Rather, the ballast was delivered by the seller directly to the 
common carrier. 
Respondent further argues that the Union Pacific cannot 
avoid its tax liability by a chameleon like change from common 
carrier to purchaser. There is nothing either mysterious or 
suspicious about Union Pacific's acting both as a common carrier 
and as a purchaser. In this case, the Union Pacific in order to 
have the same rights as any other similar purchaser—i.e. one who 
purchases material for delivery out-of-state of the same size and 
quantity—must be able to act in both capacities or it would be 
deprived the same rights as all other tax payers. 
Were the Union Pacific to deliver the ballast to the 
Denver & Rio Grande Railroad or the Southern Pacific Railroad in 
Nevada or Oregon, those entities would not be subject to the 
sales tax. There is no reason why the Union Pacific Railroad 
should be disadvantaged simply because it is the only common 
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carrier capable of delivering the products in an economical 
fashion. 
B. THE TAX COMMISSION ASSESSING SALES 
TAX ON THE MILLING SERVICES 
RENDERED OUT-OF-STATE IS NOT 
ALLOWABLE UNDER EITHER UTAH OR 
FEDERAL LAW 
The Union Pacific in this case does not contest that it 
must pay sales tax on railroad ties purchased outside the state 
of Utah which are then shipped for use inside the state of Utah. 
In fact, Union Pacific did pay such a sales tax. However, the 
auditing division added to that purchase price an increment 
specifically attributable to milling charges paid by the Union 
Pacific for services rendered outside the state of Utah 
(Transcript at p. 48). 
In response, the Respondent stated on page 19 of its 
brief that "there was no testimony nor other documentation before 
the Tax Commission which indicated that the milling services were 
performed or billed separately from the creosote treatment 
process of the ties. Further, the state took the position that 
"the treatment involved installing tangible personal property in 
connection with other tangible personal property." 
Neither of these statements is true. The costs for 
milling were clearly segregated. Moreover, the milling costs 
were not "installation costs" but rather costs paid for services 
rendered outside the state of Utah. These charges had nothing to 
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do with "repairing or renovating personal property" as claimed by 
Appellee. (Brief of Appellee at p. 12 and 13) 
For Utah to purport to affix a sales tax to services 
rendered by a vendor in the state of Oregon would be in excess of 
the constitutional limits imposed on Utah's power to levy sales 
taxes. The foundational case on this issue is Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). In Complete Auto, 
the United States Supreme Court set forth a four part test for 
analyzing commerce clause challenges. In order to sustain a tax, 
it must be shown that "(1) the tax is applied to activities with 
a substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly 
apportioned, (3) does not discriminate against interstate 
commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided by 
the state." Id. at 7279. The tax in question fails the first 
and second parts of the Complete Auto analysis. 
The activity which the Tax Commission is attempting to 
tax are services which were completely performed in Oregon. The 
taxable sale of the railroad ties occurred prior to the time that 
the milling services were rendered. Those services were 
independent from the purchase and, although Oregon can clearly 
tax those activities, the services have no nexus whatsoever with 
the state of Utah. Therefore, the tax fails the first part of 
the Complete Auto test. 
Because the tax fails the first part of Complete Auto, 
it necessarily fails the second part of the test. Because the 
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services are performed within Oregon, Oregon can tax those 
services. Utah, however, has no right to tax those services and 
cannot fairly apportion its tax to include those services. 
Moreover, Utah's attempt to tax those services creates the 
probability that the activities will be taxed twice. (Whether or 
not Oregon actually taxes those services is not determinative). 
Armco Inc. v. Hardestv, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984). 
Under Complete Auto, Utah may not tax those activities 
in question because they are completely performed from outside of 
the state and have no nexus with the state of Utah. Utah simply 
cannot tax services rendered in all states on personal property 
just because that personal property subsequently may be found in 
the state of Utah. If so, Utah could tax repair of furniture 
subsequently shipped to Utah, tax services performed on cars and 
trucks that later come to Utah, tax repairs on office equipment 
that later comes to Utah, etc. 
The statute in question clearly contemplates by its 
language that the vendors performing such services will reside in 
the state of Utah. In this case, they do not. 
For all of the above reasons, Petitioner respectfully 
submits that the service charges in question are not subject to 
Utah sales tax. 
C. THE TAXES IMPOSED SHOULD NOT 
INCLUDE ANY PENALTY 
Under Utah law, it is within the discretion of the Tax 
Commission to assess penalties for the failure to pay taxes if 
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the taxpayer was at least negligent. See Robert H. Hinckley v. 
Utah State Tax ComitTn, 404 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1965). In this 
case, the Tax Commission made no finding whatsoever that 
Petitioner was negligent or otherwise culpable with respect to 
the dispute involved as a payment of taxes herein. The Audit 
Division simply added penalties to the taxes that the Tax 
Commission had found payable. 
Because the Tax Commission made no finding of 
negligence nor did it conclude that penalty should be paid, it is 
improper that they be added by independent act of the Audit 
Division subsequent to the Rule and ordered by the Tax Commission 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully 
requests that it be given the following relief: 
1. The imposition of sales and use taxes by the Tax 
Commission with respect to the purchase of ballast and fuel for 
use outside of the state of Utah should be reversed; 
2. The imposition of a sales or use tax with respect 
to milling services performed outside of the state of Utah should 
be reversed; 
3. The Tax Commission should be ordered to deduct 
from the costs of repair of railroad cars any costs attributable 
to materials on which a Utah sales tax has already been paid; and 
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4. The case should be remanded to the Utah Tax 
Coiranission with an Order that taxes previously paid by the Union 
Pacific, including penalty and interest, be refunded. 
DATED this 16th day of October, 1991. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
B y ^ ^ 
Robert A. Peterson 
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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